Air Force BCMR Decision on MEDCON/Separation Active Duty needing MEB/PEB

Jason Perry

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The attached case is a major AFBCMR decision concerning MEDCON orders/separation from active duty while needing MEB/PEB processing.

I was the attorney in this case (and while I have my client's permission to publicly discuss this case, I have redacted his name from the decision). Essentially, my client was released from active duty orders in March 2010, and was found unfit by the IPEB in August, 2010. He was ultimately permanently retired for disability by the AF on 24 SEP 2010. We filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims in December, 2010. The case was remanded to the AFBCMR by the court. A few days ago, the AFBCMR ruled in my client's favor and found he was improperly separated from active duty. He is being credited with the active duty pay and allowances between his separation and ultimate disability retirement. (Please note that the outcome in this case does not mean that anyone will reach a similar result- the specifics of each case will determine the outcome).

What is important to note is that the Reserve Command Office of the Surgeon General recommended denial based on a policy memo, while the The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force (Administrative Law Division), agreed with my argument that the policy memo contradicted superior statutory and regulatory provisions:

"AF/JAA indicates the applicant's request for back-dated orders
to satisfy pay and allowance benefits was inappropriately
recommended for denial by AFRC/SG. To the extent the 2 0 0 6
AF/RE Policy memo, Change to AFMAN 36-8001, contradicts DODI
1241.2, paragraph 6.6.3.2., AFI 36-3212, paragraph 8.6.2, or
AFI 36-8001, paragraph 1.6.3., it is invalid. Both DoDI 1241.2
and AFI 36-3212 dictate that a reserve member on active duty
under order to active duty specifying a period of more than
30 days, who incurs or aggravates an injury, illness, or
disease in the LOD shall be continued on active duty until the
member is determined fit for duty or the member is separated or
retired as a result of the Disability Evaluation System (DES).
While paragraph 6. 6. 3. 2 of DoDI 1241.2 does not specifically
provide that the members of the DES make the "fit for duty"
determination, the paragraph's clear intent is that a member
undergoing a DES remains on active duty until the results of
the DES are known. In this case, AFRC/SGP' s decision to deny
the applicant's request for medical continuation orders was
based upon AFRC/SGP's determination the applicant was able to
perform military duty, effective 18 Mar 10. However, this
decision was not made as a result of the DES, since the DES did
not make its decision until 13 Aug 10. In addition, the
individual who made the "fit for duty" determination was not a
member of the DES; he was, instead, an AFRC/SGP physician.
Finally, the applicant's orders were terminated on 28 Mar 10 by
AFRC/SGP, well prior to a final disposition by the DES on
13 Aug 10."

The BCMR agreed with me and the AF/JAA and recommended my client be credited with active duty pay and allowances between his separation from active duty and ultimate disability retirement.

This AFBCMR decision stands for the proposition that the AFRC/SG (and often, AFMOA) cannot contradict superior regulations requiring retention of reservists on active duty for DES processing and separate reservists from active duty prior to disposition of their Disability Evaluation System case. This is an important decision that potentially will impact many AFRC/ANG members.

I will comment further on the implications in the future, however, I wanted to get this case "out to the field" as soon as possible.
 

Attachments

  • Pages from AFBCMR Decision 2011-03171_Redacted.pdf
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The beauty of the BCMR/BCNR is they make their own decision. And that decision is not always based on error. What happened could be in accordance with regulation and law. But was it fair? The Boards can and will correct a record based solely on injustice.

As a side note, the BCMR/BCNR cases are not precedent setting. Precedent in a case requires a legal body and the Boards are administrative. However, the Boards cannot be arbitrary and capricious. So citing the case in like cases would lend weight to the new case.

Congradulations Jason! You fought the good fight and won.
 
Jason,
Great job! Thanks for everything.
 
Thanks Jason!

Wondering if this decision would change how my case was handled?

ANG - Deployed aug 2010 to Feb 2011. Medcon from Apr 2011 to Sep 2011. MEB started Mar 2012. Surgery for LOD Sep 2012 - Medcon Orders denied by AFMOA, told to use INCAP. Base refused to appeal AFMOA decision. Basically denied at least 350 points towards retirement - would have pushed me up to next pay band (12 vs 10 years).
 
Since it started in FC, was remanded to BCMR, will FC make a final adjudication? I would assume this way it could be used as precedent in future cases.
 
Since it started in FC, was remanded to BCMR, will FC make a final adjudication? I would assume this way it could be used as precedent in future cases.

No, the way it works is that when the BCMR grants full relief, the case is dismissed by the parties (as there is no controversy before the court). So, the BCMR decision itself is what is important here.

As to whether BCMR decisions are precedential this recent case states:

"Plaintiff argues that the ABCMR's decision in his case was arbitrary and capricious because the Board did not properly distinguish relevant precedent. Compl., ¶¶ 47-62. Defendant first responds that the ABCMR is not bound by precedent because it is a board of equity. Def. Mot. at 16-17. Defendant has not cited a single case in support of this novel legal argument. On the contrary, in this Circuit, "it is axiomatic that '[a]n agency must treat similar cases in a similar manner unless it can provide a legitimate reason for failing to do so.'" Kreis III, 406 F.3d at 687 (quoting Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1258, 320 U.S. App. D.C. 107 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Indeed, a "fundamental norm of administrative procedure requires an agency to treat like cases alike," Westar Energy, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241, 374 U.S. App. D.C. 256 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and an agency "must provide an adequate explanation to justify treating similarly situated parties differently." Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 403 F.3d 771, 776, 365 U.S. App. D.C. 287 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This is not to say that the broad discretion afforded to the ABCMR, as discussed above, does not also grant it significant flexibility in judging the respective merits of each application for review. Nonetheless, "[l]ike a court, '[n]ormally, an agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating cases before it.'" Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1120, 392 U.S. App. D.C. 145 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 315 F.3d 316, 323, 354 U.S. App. D.C. 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

Even if the ABCMR is not required to distinguish every similar prior decision, the need to consider relevant precedent becomes especially acute when a plaintiff has pointed to a specific prior decision as very similar to his own situation. In such cases, the Board may not simply ignore such precedent for the sake of expediency. To do so would leave open the possibility that two identical cases would be decided differently. Nothing could be more arbitrary or capricious. See Etelson v. Office of Personnel Management, 684 F.2d 918, 926, 221 U.S. App. D.C. 396 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Government is at its most arbitrary when it treats similarly situated people differently."); El Rio Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ctr., Inc. v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 300 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2004) ("f an agency treats similarly situated parties differently, its action is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.") (internal citation omitted)."

Wilhelmus v. Geren, 796 F. Supp. 2d 157, 159 (D.D.C. 2011)

Note that this is a Federal District Court case- raising the issue of whether this case is precedential itself. A quick look at the case subsequent history and citing decisions shows that it has not been overturned (or cited with approval) by a higher court. It has only been cited in a handful of other district court cases. So, it seems to me that while an important case, technically, it is probably only persuasive authority.

What does that mean for a claimant/plaintiff in a BCMR case? Well, it seems smart to me to present to the BCMR any cases where a similarly situated claimant was granted relief. This would do a few things: 1) It may persuade the BCMR that granting relief is the correct outcome; 2) It will at least allow an argument before a reviewing court that the BCMR denial was arbitrary and capricious based on having previously granting relief in a similar case.

I suspect that this issue of precedential value of BCMR decisions will be addressed again in the future (especially if claimants raise this issue, are denied relief, and later appeal based on this point).
 
Congrats Jason!!! I received a call from a PEBLO and was told my commander was going to need to submit a commander's letter (don't know exactly what the contents of the letter will contain) for an IRILO(?) which would be sent to the head flight surgeon at Hickam AFB for review and then sent to NGB. Would this negate the need for an MEB for my condition, pulmonary embolism? Because I am required to be on an anticoagulation treatment for 6 months (stated in a waiver guide handout from my PCM which would technically end on 1 April,) can NGB or the flight surgeon say I'm "fit for duty"? I was denied my MEDCON orders because I did not have enough appointments and NGB is saying that I am fit for military duties but I've stressed that the MEB has not officially stated or a final disposition of my condition has not been made.
 
Thank you Jason for your diligent work in the above case, as well as the exceptional work with this forum it has been a huge help for so many.

I was wondering if I could get some advice pertaining to MEDCON orders from you and everyone else on here. I have been on MEDCON since May 2012 for a LOD of sustained symptomatic ventricular tachycardia with AICD subsequently implanted in Aug 12 and then MEB started immediately. Case has been at AFPC since Sept 26, 2012. Peblo from AFPC made contact with me for teleconference to start initial review on 10/30/12. Supposed to take 2-4 weeks, consults scheduled the next 1-2 weeks and C&P appointments conducted in 3-4 weeks. So Initial review supposed to be completed 11/30/12, C&P exams scheduled by 12/15/12, exams done by 01/15/12. I have not even been given exam dates yet. I have had breaks in pay/benefits every 60 days due to the fact unit cant process paper in time since May. Peblo told me that there is a chance that AFMOA takes me off MEDCON orders until my case reaches VA or if I do not have enough medical appointments like many others on here have had happened to them. So, I'm very concerned about being cut off from MEDCON at any given time and since I can not perform my civilian job I would have a financial hardship. I have possibly two jobs lined up with a state agency which have very good beneies and decent pay. I was wondering what are the benefits for staying on MEDCON in lieu of passing up a great chance to start a new stable career which I will have to do eventually once this whole process is complete. I have thought about taking the state job and requesting to be taken off MEDCON, and then just let the rest of my MEB run it's course while in traditional guard status. What is everyone thoughts on this? Any help would be Awesome. Thanks for everyone's help so far.
 
No, the way it works is that when the BCMR grants full relief, the case is dismissed by the parties (as there is no controversy before the court). So, the BCMR decision itself is what is important here.

As to whether BCMR decisions are precedential this recent case states:

I suspect that this issue of precedential value of BCMR decisions will be addressed again in the future (especially if claimants raise this issue, are denied relief, and later appeal based on this point).

Thanks Jason.
 
No, the way it works is that when the BCMR grants full relief, the case is dismissed by the parties (as there is no controversy before the court). So, the BCMR decision itself is what is important here.

As to whether BCMR decisions are precedential this recent case states:

"Plaintiff argues that the ABCMR's decision in his case was arbitrary and capricious because the Board did not properly distinguish relevant precedent. Compl., ¶¶ 47-62. Defendant first responds that the ABCMR is not bound by precedent because it is a board of equity. Def. Mot. at 16-17. Defendant has not cited a single case in support of this novel legal argument. On the contrary, in this Circuit, "it is axiomatic that '[a]n agency must treat similar cases in a similar manner unless it can provide a legitimate reason for failing to do so.'" Kreis III, 406 F.3d at 687 (quoting Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1258, 320 U.S. App. D.C. 107 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Indeed, a "fundamental norm of administrative procedure requires an agency to treat like cases alike," Westar Energy, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241, 374 U.S. App. D.C. 256 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and an agency "must provide an adequate explanation to justify treating similarly situated parties differently." Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 403 F.3d 771, 776, 365 U.S. App. D.C. 287 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This is not to say that the broad discretion afforded to the ABCMR, as discussed above, does not also grant it significant flexibility in judging the respective merits of each application for review. Nonetheless, "[l]ike a court, '[n]ormally, an agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating cases before it.'" Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1120, 392 U.S. App. D.C. 145 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 315 F.3d 316, 323, 354 U.S. App. D.C. 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

Even if the ABCMR is not required to distinguish every similar prior decision, the need to consider relevant precedent becomes especially acute when a plaintiff has pointed to a specific prior decision as very similar to his own situation. In such cases, the Board may not simply ignore such precedent for the sake of expediency. To do so would leave open the possibility that two identical cases would be decided differently. Nothing could be more arbitrary or capricious. See Etelson v. Office of Personnel Management, 684 F.2d 918, 926, 221 U.S. App. D.C. 396 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Government is at its most arbitrary when it treats similarly situated people differently."); El Rio Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ctr., Inc. v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 300 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2004) ("f an agency treats similarly situated parties differently, its action is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.") (internal citation omitted)."

Wilhelmus v. Geren, 796 F. Supp. 2d 157, 159 (D.D.C. 2011)

Note that this is a Federal District Court case- raising the issue of whether this case is precedential itself. A quick look at the case subsequent history and citing decisions shows that it has not been overturned (or cited with approval) by a higher court. It has only been cited in a handful of other district court cases. So, it seems to me that while an important case, technically, it is probably only persuasive authority.

What does that mean for a claimant/plaintiff in a BCMR case? Well, it seems smart to me to present to the BCMR any cases where a similarly situated claimant was granted relief. This would do a few things: 1) It may persuade the BCMR that granting relief is the correct outcome; 2) It will at least allow an argument before a reviewing court that the BCMR denial was arbitrary and capricious based on having previously granting relief in a similar case.

I suspect that this issue of precedential value of BCMR decisions will be addressed again in the future (especially if claimants raise this issue, are denied relief, and later appeal based on this point).

I'm familiar with this ruling. We did not take that as our cases establishing precedence. It was telling us we couldn't be arbitrary and capricious. We only had to insure that we addressed why the same outcome was not forthcoming in our deliberation of the similar case. However, if the two cases were exactly the same, we would have no choice but to have the same outcome.
 
I'm familiar with this ruling. We did not take that as our cases establishing precedence. It was telling us we couldn't be arbitrary and capricious. We only had to insure that we addressed why the same outcome was not forthcoming in our deliberation of the similar case. However, if the two cases were exactly the same, we would have no choice but to have the same outcome.

I think a strict reading of the case says that earlier decisions on same facts are "precedential." Especially given this passage:
Nonetheless, "[l]ike a court, '[n]ormally, an agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating cases before it.'"

That said, I am not sure the distinction as to whether the analysis required means earlier decisions are precedential or not is so important given that the outcome seems to be the same. I think it is true that agencies have to treat like claimants the same...but, yes, if the agency can point to a reason why the decision is different in a later case and that basis also not arbitrary and capricious, then the agency can come to a different decision.

An interesting point, I think, is that this whole issue of precedential value of decisions could be complicated (and perhaps would insulate the agencies/BCMR's somewhat) if they decided cases on the basis of "injustice" and Secretarial discretion rather than a legal reason...though, I also think this could open another line of inquiry into whether purely discretionary decisions are subject to this same precedent analysis; that is, if the BCMR decides on injustice/discretionary points in one case, does that mean that the same discretion must be exercised in favor of a similarly situated claimant).
 
I think one of the issues is, while the ABCMR Director attempts to obtain somewhat uniform decisions from the Board, the Board is free to recommend whatever it wants. And the board membership changes with each board. So the fact that two board panels have different recommendations is not overly surprising. However, the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Army Review Boards) does use her discretion to keep the board decisions somewhat uniform.

Since the ABCMR is not a legal body it is not governed by rules of evidence or other legal requirements contained in the MCM. Trying to maintain consistancy in its decisions is a tough job.
 
Since the ABCMR is not a legal body it is not governed by rules of evidence or other legal requirements contained in the MCM. Trying to maintain consistancy in its decisions is a tough job.

I am aware that the BCMRs (and, the PEBs) state in various places that they are not legal bodies (as far as the PEB, both AR 635-40 states language about rules of evidence not applying, and the opening remarks in the PEB formal "script" uses language about the hearing not being like a court-hearing and rules of evidence not applying). However, their self-descriptors I don't think match up to what is "technically" the answer. I think that they are "legal bodies" and would be analyzed (and are) as an informal adjudicatory body under Administrative Procedures Act. The distinction does not matter at the board/BCMR level, I think, because in a sense that is a "closed universe." However, on appeal, I think it does matter. (And, there are specific evidentiary issues that, notwithstanding statements/rules to the contrary, are binding and apply to the BCMR's- the most obvious being privileged testimony, but, notably "hearsay" in some contexts...there is a case out there, I would have to find it, but it says that hearsay, objected to at the administrative level, that is not supported by any independent facts, should be excluded as a basis for making a decision). (The MCM does not apply, except to the extent there are any questions raised where the member is suspected of a crime, they still have to be given a rights advisement....the important distinction here is that Manual for Courts-Martial deal, of course, with criminal law and PEB/BCMR cases deal with civil law issues).

I don't mean to be pedantic and am not sure how much it matters in most cases....however, I do think that some of these issues are not so clear cut IF fought out in court.

In my mind, there lack of precedential value (especially, the BCMR's not citing to other BCMR cases) makes the job of uniform decisions much harder. Though, I also think the lack of volume of review by the courts of BCMR decisions makes the job of getting uniform and correct decisions harder (that is, essentially, I don't think there is enough guidance given from the courts to the BCMR...but, a part of this is due to folks not appealing most adverse BCMR decisions).
 
However, the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Army Review Boards) does use her discretion to keep the board decisions somewhat uniform.

That is good to hear, though.
 
This is exactly the same situation I was in, I was on ADOS orders for over 3 years, when at a PHA I was found unfit for duty. My orders were immediatley terminated, and I was forced to take terminal leave. It took me 18 months to get back on ADME orders. I went to the commander with the DODI in hand, I went to the S1, the Brigade Commander, the IG and Congressman, all with the proper documentation and a DODI to back me up.

The answer was always, when you get fit for duty we can put you back on ordres.
EGADS, the things the government can get away with.

Thanks for the fight Jason, a win here and there is a win for all of us.
 
I received a memo from NGB stating I was medically qualified to return to duty with a ALC code of C-2 dated 5 February through the MEB processing. I have been off orders since 9 December. Shouldn't I have been on orders between these dates?
Is there a way to check if my MEB package made it past NGB to the MEB. I think my condition was cleared by NGB Surgeon and not an MEB. I was also told that NGB medical said I was stable now which is why I was denied MEDCON orders. I still have 2 months of required anticoagulation treatment taking blood thinner medication. Does that seem right that they can medically clear me but I have 2 more months of treatment and not to mention a blood clot filter in my vein needs to be removed?
 
I am a SPC/E-4 in the ARNG. I have a similar problem to this.

Timeline:
APR 09 - Injury Occurred Surgery during IDT Drill and LOD was approved
DEC 09 - ADME Approved, Title 10 Orders
JAN 10 - Surgery for Injury
JUN 10 - Same Injury Occurred again
AUG 10 - Surgery for Injury again.
MAY 11 - Discharged, RTD to National Guard Unit, Despite my protest to stay until fully healed and continued medical treatment.
SEP 11 - Found Unfit, P3 profile made, IDES initiated.

From MAY 11 till present I am nearing the final phases of IDES. I am currently going through a FPEB. Since my discharge life was tough with my injury and have been unemployed the whole time. I used up all my savings and all unemployment benefits. I was denied AD from both Army National Guard and WTU. I could not apply for AGR or ADOS positions and lost quite a few opportunities, even promotion. On the civilian side, it has been tough finding a job due to my limitations and frequent hospital visits.

I want to be AD for the remainder of the IDES process. I want my DD-214 to be corrected and back pay if I am entitled to it.

My question is, what do I do? What steps I need to take? I am only 25 and don't know what to do.

Respectfully,
Mokorr
 
I am in the exact situation as the case above. I have filled a IG complaint. Was that the best course of action? There is alot of money in play, and I am very lost on how to make sure my case is handled properly. Pls help
Dave
 
I am in the exact situation as the case above. I have filled a IG complaint. Was that the best course of action? There is alot of money in play, and I am very lost on how to make sure my case is handled properly. Pls help
Dave

IG complaints can help. However, often they do not. So, depending on other factors (such as whether there are any time/statute of limitations issues) maybe IG was a fine course of action. If it works, great!

It may make sense to secure legal services from an attorney with experience in these matters.

Hope you get all that you are due!
 
The attached case is a major AFBCMR decision concerning MEDCON orders/separation from active duty while needing MEB/PEB processing.

I was the attorney in this case (and while I have my client's permission to publicly discuss this case, I have redacted his name from the decision). Essentially, my client was released from active duty orders in March 2010, and was found unfit by the IPEB in August, 2010. He was ultimately permanently retired for disability by the AF on 24 SEP 2010. We filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims in December, 2010. The case was remanded to the AFBCMR by the court. A few days ago, the AFBCMR ruled in my client's favor and found he was improperly separated from active duty. He is being credited with the active duty pay and allowances between his separation and ultimate disability retirement. (Please note that the outcome in this case does not mean that anyone will reach a similar result- the specifics of each case will determine the outcome).

What is important to note is that the Reserve Command Office of the Surgeon General recommended denial based on a policy memo, while the The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force (Administrative Law Division), agreed with my argument that the policy memo contradicted superior statutory and regulatory provisions:

"AF/JAA indicates the applicant's request for back-dated orders
to satisfy pay and allowance benefits was inappropriately
recommended for denial by AFRC/SG. To the extent the 2 0 0 6
AF/RE Policy memo, Change to AFMAN 36-8001, contradicts DODI
1241.2, paragraph 6.6.3.2., AFI 36-3212, paragraph 8.6.2, or
AFI 36-8001, paragraph 1.6.3., it is invalid. Both DoDI 1241.2
and AFI 36-3212 dictate that a reserve member on active duty
under order to active duty specifying a period of more than
30 days, who incurs or aggravates an injury, illness, or
disease in the LOD shall be continued on active duty until the
member is determined fit for duty or the member is separated or
retired as a result of the Disability Evaluation System (DES).
While paragraph 6. 6. 3. 2 of DoDI 1241.2 does not specifically
provide that the members of the DES make the "fit for duty"
determination, the paragraph's clear intent is that a member
undergoing a DES remains on active duty until the results of
the DES are known. In this case, AFRC/SGP' s decision to deny
the applicant's request for medical continuation orders was
based upon AFRC/SGP's determination the applicant was able to
perform military duty, effective 18 Mar 10. However, this
decision was not made as a result of the DES, since the DES did
not make its decision until 13 Aug 10. In addition, the
individual who made the "fit for duty" determination was not a
member of the DES; he was, instead, an AFRC/SGP physician.
Finally, the applicant's orders were terminated on 28 Mar 10 by
AFRC/SGP, well prior to a final disposition by the DES on
13 Aug 10."

The BCMR agreed with me and the AF/JAA and recommended my client be credited with active duty pay and allowances between his separation from active duty and ultimate disability retirement.

This AFBCMR decision stands for the proposition that the AFRC/SG (and often, AFMOA) cannot contradict superior regulations requiring retention of reservists on active duty for DES processing and separate reservists from active duty prior to disposition of their Disability Evaluation System case. This is an important decision that potentially will impact many AFRC/ANG members.

I will comment further on the implications in the future, however, I wanted to get this case "out to the field" as soon as possible.



I have a question for u Jason, I was separated from the coast Guard after serving 15 years, 10 from the coast Guard and 5 from the Army. I was trying to finish my 20 but was not allowed to reenlist. Instead while going through a MEB was separated for End of enlistment. I was told I was not being kicked oUT but that the coast Guard no longer needed my services....I was being med boarded for ptsd and for my knees, multiple surgeries... I got rated what I was suppose to get from VA bUT got nothing from the coast guard...they separated while I was at a mental hospital receiving treatment for my ptsd...picked me up signed dd214 and dropped me off. They slid me under the door and tried to forget about me....I was kicked out of military housing and forced to become homeless for 22 days along with my wife and my five kids...the reason kicked out of housing is because my command housing that I would be out of the military in 10 days and to get me out....can I fight my case and discharge to go through a medical board that was promised but never completed..I just want to be treated equally....thank u......


Tapuni Uli
 
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